Why Denmark should either abandon its peg to the euro or join the single currency by Codogno, Lorenzo & de Grauwe, Paul
Credit: David Dennis (CC-BY-SA-3.0)
12/03/2015
Why Denmark should either abandon its peg to the euro or join
the single currency
blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2015/03/12/why-denmark-should-either-abandon-its-peg-to-the-euro-or-join-the-single-currency/
Following Switzerland’s announcement in January that it would no longer hold the Swiss franc at a
ﬁxed exchange rate with the euro, Denmark has faced mounting speculation that it will follow suit
and abandon its euro peg. Lorenzo Codogno and Paul De Grauwe write that there is a paradox in
the approach of Denmark to the issue: the Danish central bank has made it clear that it will never
change its parity with the euro, but if this is true then there is no reason for the country to avoid
joining the single currency. They argue that while there are still instruments available to resist the
immediate pressure from ﬁnancial markets, ultimately the costs of any adjustment in policy will be
lower if action is pursued now.
Being a central banker in Denmark is no fun. In normal times you just cut and paste the decision
made in Frankfurt by the European Central Bank (ECB), without having a say on it. If the currency
peg is under pressure you can only act in ways that may be perceived to have negative implications
for your economy and citizens. In fact, policy options include currency intervention ﬁrst and then
either higher or lower interest rates depending on whether there is upward or downward pressure
on the currency. And ﬁnally you do not even have a mandate on the ultimate decision, i.e.
abandoning the peg in favour of a more ﬂexible regime or joining the euro.
Danmarks Nationalbank cut its deposit facility rates to
a record low of -0.75 per cent on 5 February. It was
forced to buy a record DKK 275 billion (EUR 37
billion) worth of foreign currency in January-February
in an attempt to counter the upward pressure on the
Danish krone and preserve the peg, thereby driving
up foreign reserves to about DKK 737 billion (EUR
100 billion). The size of the central bank balance
sheet is not huge but it has already exceeded 30 per
cent of GDP.
Denmark is bound by a Treaty agreement to comply
with a ﬂuctuation band within the framework of the
European Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM II).
Since January 1999 the ﬂuctuation band has been
+/-2.25 per cent with respect to the central parity of
7.4604, i.e. 7.29252-7.62824. Eﬀectively, the band
has been maintained within an even narrower 1 per
cent ﬂuctuation. According to the ERM II, the ECB is
contractually obliged to intervene together with the central bank of the country when the currency reaches one of the
band limits.
The peg has been the backbone of economic policy in Denmark and according to the recent IMF’s Article IV, “it has
served Denmark well. It has anchored inﬂation and interest rates and facilitated trade with the neighbouring euro-
area countries”.
All that is true but here is the paradox of the choice made by Denmark to peg to the euro. The Danish central bank
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has made it clear that it will never, never change the parity with the euro. But if it is serious about this, it makes no
sense to keep Danish krone. The Danes could as well take over the euro. This is in fact the only choice that makes it
fully credible that the parity will never be changed. All the beneﬁts that the forever ﬁxed rate can generate
(“anchoring inﬂation and interest rates, facilitation of trade with neighbours” in the IMF parlance) can also be had
when joining the euro. In addition in that case the Governor of the Danmarks Nationalbank would sit around the ECB
table in Frankfurt to co-decide about monetary policies, while today he has to wait close to the telephone for news
from Frankfurt to learn what he should do.
Since Denmark keeps its own currency and exchange rate with the euro it signals that it is keeping an option, i.e. the
possibility to change the parity in the future. If it does not want to signal this, it can simply take over the euro. The
very existence of the option indicates that Denmark prefers to keep the door open to devalue (or to revalue). This
choice makes perfect sense. Denmark may in the future be subject to a large shock that will be absorbed with lesser
cost if the currency is devalued (or revalued, depending on the nature of the shock). In fact keeping the krone only
makes sense if one wants to keep this option open.
The problem with this option is that it can easily trigger destabilising speculative movements that in the end will force
the central bank to change the parity even if it does not want to do so.
Put diﬀerently, the currency peg is like an option with a negative present value that the Danish perceive is worth
paying. If you strongly believe in the peg and in the commitment that it will not be changed for the time being, then it
would be much better to simply join the euro. If instead you believe this option is worth having it is undermining your
own commitment to the peg. The peg would look like the “Emperor’s New Clothes”, which happens to be a novel by
a Danish author, Hans Christian Andersen. At some point, ﬁnancial markets will dare to say the Emperor isn’t
wearing anything at all given that the very existence of the peg undermines the commitment. And, guess what, this
would force you to exercise your option.
It is sometimes said that this problem only arises when the currency is subject to downward pressure. With the
current upward pressure on the Danish krone, allowing reserves to increase and interest rates to go deeply negative
appears a much easier course of action. There is no need to ask the ECB to come to the rescue. “We have an
unlimited supply of our own currency, the krone. And we are going to do whatever it takes to defend the peg” said
Lars Rohde, Denmark’s central bank governor. At least in theory, there is no limit to the size of reserves you can
build up by printing money and interest rates can be crashed well below zero, thereby enjoying a nice positive carry.
But it is a fallacy. If not fully sterilised, it may come at the cost of ﬂooding the economy with liquidity, which inevitably
causes bubbles in asset prices, strain on the ﬁnancial industry and other disequilibria in the economy. Close-to-zero
interest rates on short-term mortgages may have contributed to an inﬂation of mortgage lending which stands at
about 300 per cent of disposable income. With monetary policy focused on the peg, any other objectives, including
ﬁghting inﬂation when the peg is not enough, would fall under ﬁscal policy, which may not be best suited to deal with
them.
Denmark’s ﬁxed exchange rate implies that the nominal interest rate remains ﬁxed after a shift in the ﬁscal stance
and eﬀects are absorbed by foreign trade due to the high degree of openness of the Danish economy. However, if
the economy does not run fully in lockstep with the Eurozone’s, or Germany’s for that matter, managing the
currency, aggregate demand and inﬂation at the same time may turn out very diﬃcult. Bottom line: the peg makes
sense only as a transition to the single European currency, as in the spirit of ERM II.
Unfortunately, de-pegging may happen even if there is nothing wrong with your own economy. Despite “whatever it
takes” commitments by policy makers, ﬁnancial markets may come to believe that there is a non-negligible risk of
euro break-up and that Denmark will side with the German bloc. Then the krone would immediately experience huge
inﬂows of capital that would make the peg unsustainable. The “safe haven eﬀect” has materialised on several
occasions since the start of the sovereign debt crisis and even very recently.
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No currency peg can last forever and the krone peg to the euro has already lasted more than ﬁfteen years. Taking
into account the former peg to the Deutschmark that dates back to 1982, there is more than a 30-year association
with ﬁxed exchange rates (with the last adjustment in central parity decided in 1986). The Swiss National Bank
learned it the hard way: the longer you wait the harder may be the landing and, despite the beneﬁts enjoyed in the
past, it may lead the economy into a painful adjustment.
There is one major diﬀerence versus Switzerland, however. The Swiss decision was fully within the remit of the
Swiss National Bank. The Danish central bank cannot convene its board over a long weekend and decide on the
peg as it acts on a political mandate. And politics, by deﬁnition, is a messy and slow process. Economy Minister
Ostergaard said recently that the policy was not in doubt and that “no serious politician” would propose leaving the
peg.
But it would not be just up to Danish politicians. The ERM II provisions dictate that any decisions on central rates
and ﬂuctuation bands would require agreement between euro area ministers, the ECB and the ministers and central
bank governors of the non-euro area Member States participating in ERM II. Moreover, it would be a co-decision in
which the European Commission would also participate. In a nutshell, diﬃculties of exiting the peg do not make the
peg any more credible but rather more vulnerable to ﬁnancial market tensions.
So what’s the way out? In the near term there are still plenty of instruments the Danish Central Bank or the Ministry
of Finance can use to resist any pressure. One example is the recent suspension of the issuance of long-dated
government bonds. But how long can it last?
Admittedly, it does not sound an easy option given current Eurozone problems and poor economic performance. But
if Danish policymakers believe that the economy is prepared to make the necessary adjustments to be irrevocably
linked to the Eurozone, then why not join the euro?
If not, then you are left with one option: let ﬁnancial markets do it for you. Sadly the poor Danish central bankers
would not have a say even this time. But allowing capitulation to happen earlier on would prevent a more sizeable
and painful adjustment at a later stage. Switzerland docet.
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